Empirical evidence of factors that influence the approval of the executive compensation package by shareholders

Authors

  • Jean Carlo Rissatti Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
  • José Alonso Borba Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
  • Lucas Martins Dias Maragno Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro
  • Edilson Paulo Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.17524/repec.v16i1.2959

Keywords:

Executive Compensation, Voting, Activism

Abstract

Objective: To analyze the factors determining the probability of approval of the executive compensation package by institutional investors of Brazilian companies listed on B3.

Method: The survey was conducted on 771 shareholder votes in the resolutions of the Annual and Extraordinary General Meetings (AAGOE), from January to April 2019, of Brazilian companies listed on B3. Data collection was performed manually and sought information in reference forms, shareholding positions, management proposals, minutes of general meetings, final analytical and synthetic voting maps. The data obtained were analyzed using logistic regressions.

Results: It shown that the total executive compensation is positively related to the approval of the executive compensation package by the shareholders, which indicates an alignment between institutional investors and executive compensation. Another result indicated that executives may be focusing on long-term performance and acting as owners to maximize company value.

Contributions: The results contribute both to the literature and to practice by demonstrating institutional investors' activism through the vote in relation to the approval of the executive compensation package. Furthermore, the determinants demonstrate how company-wide variables affect the approval of compensation packages.

   

Author Biographies

Jean Carlo Rissatti, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina

 

   

José Alonso Borba, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina

 

 

Edilson Paulo, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina

 

 

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Published

2022-04-23

How to Cite

Rissatti, J. C., Borba, J. A., Martins Dias Maragno, L., & Paulo, E. (2022). Empirical evidence of factors that influence the approval of the executive compensation package by shareholders. Journal of Education and Research in Accounting (REPeC), 16(1). https://doi.org/10.17524/repec.v16i1.2959

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